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Geoffery Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

Spreader Specialists/ Inc< v. PSC of Utah, et al,
Case No. 21037

Dear Mr. Butler:
Attached hereto is a copy of the case of Milne Truck
Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah
1986). This opinion is being provided as a supplement
to the brief of petitioner Spreader Specialists, Inc.
in the above-entitled matter which is scheduled for oral
argument on Friday, November 14, 1986. This additional
citation is submitted to the Court as further clarification
of the standard adopted for entry into the regulated common
carrier market. Further, Milne helps to explain the policy
grounds for the Court's decision in Big K Corp v. Public
Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984). Copies
have been provided to all parties.
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Very truly yours,

Michael t\ Larsen
of and for
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
MLL/ms
Attachments
cc: Craig Rich
Robert L. Stevens
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defendant knew or believed that the items
he pawned were stolen. The substantive
use of defendant's prior bad acts and felonies added greatly to the likelihood that the
jury inferred guilty knowledge from the
character of defendant. Such use was
highly prejudicial and under the circumstances of this case cannot be said to have
been harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt"
Defendant also raises several additional
points on appeal. In light of our resolution
of the above issues, we need not address
those points. Defendant's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new
trial.
STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

MILNE TRUCK LINES, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; Brent H. Cameron, David R.
Irvine and James M. Byrne, Commissioners of the Public Service Commission of Utah, and P.B.I. Freight Service, Inc., Defendants.

of existing service or future need for expanded service as prerequisite to obtaining
the authority sought; (2) denial of application based on finding that service currently
provided by another carrier was adequate
was improper; and (3) application of carrier
was not equivalent of transfer of authority
from carrier's predecessor which had abandoned the same authority the carrier
sought, such that carrier was relieved from
justifying issuance of new authority, where
predecessor's authority had been revoked.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Automobiles «=»78
Carrier which applied for common motor carrier authority to haul general commodities over irregular routes in particular
intrastate area did not have to prove inadequacy of existing service or future need for
expanded service as prerequisite to obtaining the authority sought.
2. Automobiles ^»74
Policy of law governing issuance of
certificates of public convenience and necessity for motor common carriers is to
foster competition, unless public convenience and necessity dictates otherwise.
U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5.

June 20, 1986.

3. Automobiles *=»78
Adequacy of existing motor carrier
service is only one factor which the Public
Service Commission should consider in determining whether issuance of additional
intrastate motor carrier authority is consistent with public convenience and necessity.

Carrier applied for common motor
carrier authority to haul general commodities over irregular routes between points
within particular intrastate area. The Public Service Commission denied carrier's application, and carrier petitioned for review.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that:
(1) carrier did not have to prove inadequacy

4. Automobiles *=»78
Although Public Service Commission
should not allow motor common carrier to
engage in predatory competition, beneficial
effect of competition on service and rates
should be recognized in determining whether public interest requires grant of new
intrastate carrier authority, notwithstanding adverse impact on existing carriers.

No. 19237.
Supreme Court of Utah.

21. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24,

87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 LEd.2d 705 (1967).
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5. Automobiles *»78
Diversion of traffic or revenue from
existing motor common carriers by additional competition is not a valid reason by
itself to justify denial of additional intrastate carrier authority.
6. Automobiles S=»78
Denial of motor common carrier's application for authority to haul general commodities over irregular routes between
points within particular intrastate area
based on finding that existing authorized
carrier's service was adequate was improper.
7. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=>486
Findings of administrative agency
should be sufficiently detailed to disclose
steps by which ultimate factual conclusions
or conclusions of mixed fact and law are
reached, to permit Supreme Court to perform its duty of reviewing agency's orders
in accordance with established legal principles and protecting parties and public from
arbitrary and capricious administrative action.
8. Automobiles $»78
Ultimate standard which governs issuance of certificate of intrastate motor
common carrier authority is whether the
public convenience and necessity require
granting of certificate.
9. Automobiles «=>78
Whatever would be detrimental to best
interests of the people of the state is relevant to issue of whether new intrastate
motor common carrier authority comports
with public convenience and necessity, including the effect upon existing transportation facilities in territory proposed to be
served and the traveling public. U.C.A.
1953, 54-6-5.
10. Automobiles *»78
Even though economic welfare of shippers and citizens generally in more remote
parts of the state is a significant factor in
determining whether to issue new intrastate motor common carrier authority, Public Service Commission cannot make ration-

al decision on where public interest lies
with respect to request for authority without making some effort to balance affirmative effects of competition to shippers in
the area in which shipping authority is requested against impact on carrier currently
in service and its ability to serve outlying
service areas at reasonable rates and extent to which those rates might be affected, if at all.
11. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>460
Automobiles 4=>83
Although applicant seeking intrastate
motor common carrier authority in particular area generally has burden of proof in
proceeding for new authority, protestant
who urges adverse impact upon it as reason for denying application has burden of
proof on that point, which burden cannot
be met simply by conclusory statements in
oral testimony.
12. Automobiles e=>83
Application for motor common carrier
authority to haul general commodities over
irregular routes between points within particular intrastate area was not the equivalent of a transfer of authority from one
carrier to another such that carrier applying for authority was not required to prove
that the transfer furthered public convenience and necessity where carrier's predecessor's authority had been revoked upon
predecessor's abandonment of that authority, even though the carrier applied for that
same authority the day following abandonment of the authority.
Frank S. Warner, Douglas J. Holmes,
Ogden, for appellant.
William S. Richards, David L. Wilkinson,
Atty. Gen., James L. Barker, Jr., Div. of
Public Service, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
The plaintiff, Milne Truck Lines, Inc.,
contends on this petition for review that
the Public Service Commission (PSC) erred
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in denying it common carrier authority to
haul general commodities over irregular
routes between points within the Salt LakeUtah County area.
The PSC denied Milne's application on
the ground that (1) Milne failed to prove
"either an inadequacy in the existing service or potential market growth justifying
new service" and (2) even if inadequacy of
existing service were assumed, additional
competition from Milne in the market area
was not in the public interest because it
might seriously weaken the protestant PBI
Freight Service Inc. (PBI) and result in a
loss of motor common carriage of general
commodities to remote areas of Utah outside the Salt Lake-Utah County area.
Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc., held the
same intrastate authority as that sought by
Milne until May 26, 1982, when Rio Grande
abandoned its authority. The next day
Milne was granted the same authority on a
temporary basis. PBI, a motor common
carrier which has general commodity authority over irregular routes in the same
area, protested Milne's application on the
alleged ground that competition from Milne
would put PBI out of business. PBI is the
only other carrier that has such authority
in that area.
Milne contends that the Commission
erred in four respects. It asserts that (1)
the Commission applied an erroneous legal
standard in requiring Milne to prove either
inadequacy of existing service in the market area or potential market growth which
would justify new service; (2) the Commission's finding that competition between
Milne and PBI would be detrimental to the
best interests of the state was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) Milne is
entitled to a certificate as a matter of law
because of unrebutted evidence which established a potential need for future service in the market area; and (4) Milne's
application should have been judged under
the standards which govern the transfer of
existing authority rather than those that
govern the grant of new authority because
Milne sought the same authority that Rio
Grande Motor Way had abandoned.

I. THE FACTS
The applicant, Milne Truck Lines, is a
subsidiary of Sun Oil Company and has
intrastate authority in Arizona, California,
Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as
interstate authority. The intrastate authority sought by Milne in Salt Lake and
Utah Counties was held by Rio Grande
Motor Way from approximately 1970 until
May 26, 1982. When Milne submitted its
application to the Commission on May 27
for the same authority as that abandoned
by Rio Grande, it was granted temporary
intrastate authority in the Salt Lake-Utah
County area, pursuant to which it has
served approximately 220 shippers in that
area. Following the hearing on Milne's
application for permanent authority, the
PSC found that Milne had run a systemwide deficit over the previous two years,
but found it financially At and operationally able to serve the area.
PBI Freight Service, Inc., has intrastate
common carrier authority in Utah, roughly
from Salt Lake County south, including
points in Utah, Grand, Kane, Millard, Sevier, and San Juan counties. PBI also has
interstate authority into Arizona, California, and Nevada. With the withdrawal of
Rio Grande, PBI became the only permanently authorized intrastate general commodity carrier between Salt Lake and Utah
counties, although specialized carriers compete in the market area to some extent
PBI has, according to the Commission's
findings, a reasonably sizeable net worth,
but was experiencing a cash flow problem
at the time of the hearing. For the period
January 1 through October 1, 1982, D and
H Investment Co., PBFs parent company,
had gross revenue of $2,824,758, which included operating revenue of $1,347,185, interstate truckload revenue of $414,468, contract revenue of $1,046,941, and other revenue of $16,164. For the same period, it
earned a net income of $22,660, of which
approximately $8,000 was from operations.
The Commission's finding that PBI suffered an $80,000 deficit is simply in error.
The Commission also found that PBI has
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idle equipment and can "easily provide the
proposed service at present levels or substantially increased levels."
In denying Milne's application, the Commission found that PBI's traffic into Utah
County had been "steadily declining" over
the preceding three years as a result of the
"generally poor economy, federal deregulation which had allowed an increase in the
number of interstate carriers hauling into
Utah County, and increased specialized
carrier competition." The Commission also
found that the traffic "over the past two to
three years had been at best marginal for
the support of two general commodity common carriers."
The Commission ruled that since Milne
was applying for the same authority that
an existing carrier already had, Milne had
the burden of proving either inadequacy of
existing service or a future need for additional service and that Milne had failed to
meet its burden. The Commission held
that even if PBFs service were deficient,
the public interest nevertheless required a
denial of the application because of the
potential impact of the loss of PBI service
to areas outside the Salt Lake-Utah County
market area.
II. INADEQUACY OF SERVICE AS
PREREQUISITE TO AUTHORIZATION OF NEW AUTHORITY
[1,2] The Commission erred in ruling
that Milne had to prove an inadequacy of
existing service or a future need for expanded service as a prerequisite to obtaining the authority sought. It is decidedly
not the law that established motor common
carriers should be protected by the Commission from new competition as long as
they provide a reasonably adequate service
and can meet growing demands for common carrier service. Big K Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah
1984); Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 2 Utah 2d 23, 268
P.2d 990 (1954). Utah law does not grant
certificated common carriers a vested interest in the market areas they serve; their
certificates of authority do not confer the

right to exclude competition simply to protect their own self-interest. On the contrary, it is the policy of the act to foster
competition, unless the public convenience
and necessity dictates otherwise, because
competition in most cases stimulates better
service and lower rates far more effectively and efficiently than the Commission can
by regulation.
As this Court stated in Big K, supra:
In determining whether the public interest and necessity are served by additional service, the Commission must consider numerous factors. It must weigh
the benefits to be derived from increased
competition, such as the potential beneficial effect upon rates, customer service,
the acquisition of equipment more suitable to customer needs, the efficient use
of equipment, greater responsiveness in
meeting future shipper needs, and greater efficiency in the use of route structures and interlining arrangements. In
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 103 Utah 459, 466,
135 P.2d 915, 918 (1943), this Court stated that "regulated competition is as
much within the provisions of [§ 54-6-5]
as is regulated monopoly
No one
can have a vested right to be free from
competition, to have a monopoly against
the public."
Id. at 1354.
In Big K, supra, the Commission denied
a carrier's application for route authority
which competed with existing carriers because the applicant failed to prove an inadequacy of service by the existing carriers.
This Court reversed on the ground that the
Commission had erred in holding that an
applicant's failure to prove "inadequacy of
service" required denial of the application.
The Court held that U.C.A., 1953, § 54-6-5,
which governs the issuance of certificates
of public convenience and necessity for motor common carriers, was not intended to
protect the private interests of existing
carriers in a given market, that "competition is almost always an affirmative factor
in furthering the public convenience and
necessity[,]" and that diversion of revenue
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from existing carriers by additional competition "is not a valid reason by itself to
justify a denial of additional authority."
/<£ at 1365. The Court stated:
The ultimate criterion against which all
relevant factors are to be evaluated is
the "public good and convenience," Salt
Lake & Utah Railroad Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 106 Utah 403, 408,
149 P.2d 647, 649 (1944), not the existing
carriers' convenience and necessity. See
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v.
Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 120, 339 P.2d
1011, 1014-15 (1959).... [Competition
is almost always an affirmative factor in
furthering the public convenience and necessity.
Id.
[3,4] Proof of inadequate service may
require the Commission to grant new authority, but it does not follow that proof of
adequate service requires a denial of new
authority. The Commission's duty is to
protect the public interest, not the entrenched rights of the industry it is
charged with regulating. The adequacy of
existing service is only one factor which
the Commission should consider in determining whether the issuance of additional
authority is consistent with the public convenience and necessity.1 The existence of
adequate service in a market area does not
mean that service could not be improved by
competition. Although the Commission
should not allow a carrier to engage in
predatory competition, the beneficial effect
of competition on service and rates, notwithstanding an adverse impact on existing
carriers, should be recognized in determining whether the public interest requires
new authority. We agree with the principle stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Quinn Distributing Co. Inc. v. Quast
1. Other courts have also held, consistent with
our view in Big K, supra, that inadequacy of
service is only one factor to be considered in
determining the ultimate question of the public
convenience and necessity. See, e.g., Black Ball
Freight Service, Inc. v. Washington Utilities &
Transportation Commission, 74 Wash.2d 871,
875. 447 PJJd 597, 599 (1968); Hartwig v. Pugh,
97 Idaho 236, 241, 542 ?2d 70, 75 (1975); Samardick of Grand Island-Hastings, Inc. v. B.D.C.

Transfer, Inc., 288 Minn. 442, 450, 181
N.W.2d 696, 700 (1970),
Even if Quinn's service had been always completely exemplary and even if
Quinn were able to expand its services
according to increasing demand, the commission could still reasonably conclude
that a grant to another carrier would be
in the public convenience and necessity.
[5] A corollary of the above principle is
that a diversion of traffic or revenue from
existing carriers by additional competition
is not a valid reason by itself to justify a
denial of additional authority. Big K, 689
P.2d at 1355. That principle is widely recognized. The Supreme Court of Washington in Black Ball Freight Service, Inc.
v. Washington Utilities & Transportation
Commission, 74 Wash.2d 871, 447 P.2d 597
(1968), stated that "the courts have consistently held that a possible loss in revenue is
not a sufficient ground for denying an application, when the need for more service
has been shown." Id. at 876, 447 P.2d at
600. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico stated in Garrett Freight
Lines, Inc. v. State Corporation Commission, 63 N.M. 48, 312 P.2d 1061 (1957): "A
decrease in revenue or sharing of existing
tonnage will not in itself defeat an application [by another motor carrier to furnish
additional service]." Id. at 56, 312 P.2d at
1066. See also State ex rel Churchill
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 555 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Mo.Ct.App.
1977); Bralley-Willett Tank Lines, Inc. v.
Holtzman Oil Corporation, 216 Va. 888,
890, 223 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1976). If the law
were otherwise, authorization of additional
competition would never be justified.
[6] In sum, we hold that the Commission erred in ruling that because Pitt's
Corp., 183 Neb. 229. 236. 159 N.W.2d 310. 31516 (1968); Bralley-Willett Tank Lines, inc. v.
Holtzman Oil Corp., 216 Va. 888. 890, 223 S.E2d
892, 893-94 (1976); United Van Lines, inc. v.
United States, 266 FSupp. 586, 589 (E.D.Mo.
1967); Texas Mexican Railway Co. v. United
States, 250 F.Supp. 946. 950 (S.D.Tex. 1966);
Campus Travel Inc. v. United States, 224
F.Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y.1963).
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service was adequate Milne's application
should be denied.1
III. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
17] The Commission cannot discharge
its statutory responsibilities without making findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the governing statutory
standards. It is also essential that the
Commission make subsidiary findings in
sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and
resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis
for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent
findings of fact is essential to a proper
determination by an administrative agency.
-To that end, findings should be sufficiently
detailed to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, are reached. See
generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of
reviewing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal principles
and of protecting the parties and the public
from arbitrary and capricious administrative action. In Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981),
we stated in a somewhat different context:
In administrative matters such as this,
there must be findings on all material
issues. Colorado Wyoming Gas Co. v.
Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S.
626, 65 S.Ct. 850, 89 L.Ed. 1235 (1945);
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550 (1968).
Only then can the interests of the public,
the ratepayers, and the utility be protected. Furthermore, it is not possible for
2. Milne contends that the PSC erred in finding
that PBI's service was adequate. Clearly the
evidence was conflicting; indeed, the PSC expressly acknowledged that there was at least
some degree of shipper antagonism toward, and
discontent with, PBI. However, the Commission's finding is not so devoid of substantial

this Court, without such a foundation, to
perform its assigned task of judicial *e?
view. Application of Hawaii Electric
Light Co., Inc., Hawaii, 594 P.2d 612
(1979); American Can Co. v. Davis, 28
Or.App. 207, 559 P.2d 898 (1977).
[8,9] The ultimate standard which governs the issuance of a certificate of authority is whether "the public convenience and
necessity require" the granting of a certificate. Whatever would be detrimental to
the "best interests of the people of the
state of Utah" is relevant to the issue of
whether new authority comports with the
public convenience and necessity, including
the effect upon "the existing transportation facilities in the territory proposed to be
served, and the travelling public." § 54-65. The public convenience and necessity
contemplates "the most efficient and economical service possible" to the public under the circumstances. PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commission, 598
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah 1979).
In ruling against Milne, the Commission
focused on two concerns. First, it purported to address the financial condition of PBI
and the economic conditions of the market
area in question; however, its findings
were inadequate. The Commission found
that for the past two or three years, the
Salt Lake-Utah County market area "ha3
been at best marginal for the support of
two general commodity carriers," but ft
made no subordinate findings of fact that
supported that conclusion. Indeed, Rio
Grande's operations appear to have been
profitable in that market area prior to'its
termination of operations. The Commission's findings do not indicate what PBI's
experience had been in that particular area,
although there is some evidence that it, too,
was profitable. Beyond that, the evidence
indicates that the Richfield market area
was highly profitable for PBI. The Cornsupporting evidence that it can be set aside.
Harry L Young & Sons, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 672 P.2d 728. 729 (Utah 1983);
Utah Department of Administrative Services v.
Public Service Commission. 658 P.2d 601, 609
(Utah 1983).
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mission's findings that PBFs traffic into
Utah County had declined does not necessarily mean that PBI was losing money on
that part of its operations. Furthermore,
the Commission made no finding as to
whether the decline in traffic in the Salt
Lake-Utah County market was due to a
temporary slowing of the economy or to
circumstances which might be long-term.
Milne, however, adduced evidence that the
population in the two counties was increasing rapidly and sought to infer from that
fact the conclusion that the demand for
transportation services would increase.
The Commission did not address that point
either. Beyond the inadequacy of the findings, the Commission confused a temporary
cash flow deficit, which PBI experienced,
with a deficit from operations which PBI
had not experienced, according to its latest
financial statement.

est lies in this matter without making some
effort to balance the affirmative effects of
competition to shippers in the Salt Lake
Utah County area against the impact on
PBI and its ability to serve the outlying
PBI service areas at reasonable rates and
the extent to which those rates might be
affected, if at all. The issue has particular
significance in the instant case because
PBI now has a monopoly with respect to
unrestricted common carrier authority in
the most populous area in the state. Of
course that monopoly is not an absolute
economic monopoly; there are limited
forms of competition from private carriers,
specialized common carriers, and, to some
degree, from interstate carriers. Nevertheless, the number of shippers and the
volume of freight that PBI is alone authorized to serve are no doubt significant.

Second, the Commission stated its concern that the failure of PBI "with concomitant loss of its service to remote localities
would be a detriment to the residents of
those areas." * Although that is a relevant
concern in assessing the public convenience
and necessity, it was not supported by adequate subsidiary findings of fact. The
Commission did not find that issuance of
the authority would put PBI out of business or even impair its service to those
areas. Indeed, there is no evidence of
which we are aware that would support
such a conclusion, although the Commission did find that competition in the Salt
Lake-Utah County market area would
"substantially increase the overhead costs
which would have to be allocated to other
routes extending beyond Utah County
which protestant serves
"

[11] Finally, the Commission made no
finding at all showing the relative importance of the Utah County traffic to the
total PBI operation, apparently because
there was no evidence on the point. Such
an analysis would seem essential to placing
the other findings in a context in which it is
possible to judge their importance. In this
regard, we note that although an applicant
generally has the burden of proof in a
proceeding for new authority, a protestant
who urges an adverse impact on it as a
reason for denying the application, has the
burden of proof on that point. That burden cannot be met simply by conclusory
statements in oral testimony.

[10] Even though the economic welfare
of shippers and of the citizens generally in
the more remote parts of Utah is a significant factor, the Commission cannot make a
rational decision on where the public inter3. The Commission, however, made no finding
that PBI would go out of business if Milne's
application were approved. In its conclusions
of law, the Commission referred only to the
"potential impact on areas outside the immediate proposed service area," but the Commis-

Since the Commission applied an incorrect standard in determining the effect to
be given competition in assessing the public
convenience and necessity, it is necessary
to remand to the Commission to reconsider
this case in light of the appropriate standard. It is, of course, the prerogative of
the Commission to decide the ultimate issue, but it will also be necessary for the
sion's report also refers to a shifting of some of
PBI's overhead costs to the service performed in
that area if additional authority were granted,
thereby assuming that PBI would not be put out
of business by additional competition.
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Commission to make additional findings of
fact that resolve issues which are relevant
to the legal standards that will govern the
Commission's decision. Some of those issues have been outlined above.
IV. TRANSFERABILITY OF RIO
GRANDE'S AUTHORITY
[12] Milne contends that its application
for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity was in effect a request for a
transfer of Rio Grande's certificate, which
relieved Milne of having to justify the issuance of new authority. See Collett v.
Public Service Commission, 116 Utah 413,
416, 211 P.2d 185, 187 (1949), which held
that the transfer of authority from one
carrier to another did not require the transferee to prove that the transfer furthers
the public convenience and necessity. But
that rule does not apply when the putative
transferor's authority has been revoked by
the Commission. Since Rio Grande's authority was revoked, the instant case is not
the equivalent of a transfer of authority.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM, HOWE and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F.

Wilkinson and Peter F. Leary, JJ., of po*
session of controlled substance and posset
sion of dangerous weapon by restricted
person and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Zimmerman, J., held that (1) search
which discovered narcotics vial in defendant's shirt pocket was validly conducted
incident to arrest; (2) finding that defendant possessed firearm discovered tinder
bedroom pillow was not sufficiently supported by evidence; and (3) defendant was
not denied right to speedy trial by 18month delay in rendering decision.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
1. Criminal Law <$=>394.4(13)
Drug vial found in defendant's pocket
was admissible where search was conducted incident to arrest, though officers'
search warrant authorized only search of
residence. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
2. Drugs and Narcotics «=>189
Officers were entitled to handcuff narcotics suspect while executing search warrant on his residence in order to insure
their safety, to prevent suspect from secreting contraband and to preserve premises during search. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
4.
3. Searches and Seizures 4=>141
Search warrant for residence or premises, properly issued upon probable cause,
carries with it limited authority to detain
occupant during search. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 4.
4. Arrest *=*3.4(15)
Even if officers' conduct in handcuffing narcotics suspect while executing
search warrant of his residence amounted
to arrest, officers had probable cause to
arrest narcotics suspect based upon controlled buys which had been conducted prior to search.
5. Arrest «=»71.1<8)
Search of narcotics suspect was not
invalid, despite fact it preceded formal arrest, where as arrest and search were sub-

